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Abstract 
 Between December 2009 and February 2012, Greece announced its immense 
sovereign debt crisis, received two EU/IMF bailout packages, and implemented a series 
of draconian austerity measures.  The streets of Athens erupted in anti-austerity protests 
as Greeks directed their rage against the troika and the wealthier EU states, which were 
leading the bailout process; Greeks simultaneously faced resentment and negativity from 
the creditor states as the Eurozone crisis brought to the forefront the underlying tensions 
in the EU.  This paper investigates and quantifies the backlash in Britain and Germany 
against Greece through a media content analysis to determine the extent of the bias.  
Three critical moments in the progression of the Greek crisis are examined from the 
perspective of British and German popular and elite news sources The Sun, The Financial 
Times, Bild, and Die Zeit, and their coverage is analyzed according to five core indicators 
of anti-Greek bias.  The media analysis of the crisis combined with public opinion data 
illuminates deep cleavages in the EU between the British and German national publics 
and between elites and masses, raising concerns for the future of European integration. 
 
I. Introduction 
Background 
 “This is worse than the ’40s.  This time the government is following the Germans’ 
orders.  I would prefer to die with dignity than with my head bent down,” asserted Stella 
Papafagou, an elderly Greek anti-austerity protester on the streets of Athens.1  The 
strength of her language encapsulates the ire and historical baggage underlying the Greek 
financial crisis that began in 2009; it was not only European Commission, European 
Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund, or “troika”-resenting Greeks who 
directed rage outward, but also national publics across the European Union, as media 
sources closely followed the unfolding events that seemed to reveal underlying tensions 
between the debtor and creditor states.2  In May 2010, Athens erupted in prolonged riots 
and protests in opposition to the austerity measures beginning to be imposed by the 
government of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou to combat the sovereign debt 
                                                 
1
 Niki Kitsantonis and Rachel Donadio, “Greek Parliament Passes Austerity Plan After 
Riots Rage,” New York Times, February 12, 2012, URL 1. 
2
 “Antiausterity Protests Sweep the Euro Zone,” Time: World, October 18, 2012, URL 2. 
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crisis rocking Greece and eventually other Eurozone states.3  Protests continued through 
2012 as the crisis carried on, maturing into a deep recession across the Eurozone.  
Portugal, Ireland, and Greece received bailout funds from the EU and the IMF, and it 
became clear that the new economic conditions in the Eurozone would have deep social 
and political costs for the countries adopting the EU/IMF plans, costs that led not only to 
riots and protests but also to significant changes in government, such as the election of 
SYRIZA, the coalition of the radical left, to the Greek Parliament in 2012.4  The 
continuing economic issues hold implications for EU public opinion as the discrepancies 
between debtor and creditor states draw distinctions within the Union.  The EU now acts 
in part as the arbiter of bailout and austerity packages contested from all sides, and 
European leaders struggle both abroad to end the crisis and at home to appease their 
national publics. 
 At its core, the Eurozone financial crisis is a crisis of sovereign debt, but its roots lie 
in the United States’ financial crisis beginning in 2007, which precipitated the global 
financial crisis.5  With the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the beginning of the 
global recession, states in the Eurozone with high levels of public debt faced restricted 
access to international bond markets as banks facing a liquidity crisis reduced longer term 
lending in favor of short-term securities, leading to the possibility of insolvency for the 
debtor states.  The threat of insolvency led to the EU/IMF bailouts and the austerity 
                                                 
3
 Lefteris Papadimas and Renee Maltezou, “Greek Anti-Austerity March Erupts in 
Violence, 3 Dead,” Reuters, May 5, 2010, URL 3. 
4
 Costas Lapavitsas, et al., Crisis in the Eurozone (London: Verso, 2012), 182. 
5
 Heather D. Gibson, Stephen G. Hall, and George S. Tavlas, “The Greek Financial 
Crisis: Growing Imbalances and Sovereign Spreads,” Journal of International Money and 
Finance 31, no. 3 (April 2012): 503, doi: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011.10.009. 
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requirements that accompanied them.6  A combination of factors allowed Portugal, 
Greece, and Italy to acquire the high levels of public debt that ultimately caused their 
sovereign debt crises (Ireland and Spain’s crises were brought about through different 
means).  Countries in the Eurozone are bound by the European Monetary Union and use 
the Euro as a common currency, but they do not have a fiscal union; therefore, states 
control their own taxation and spending.7  When the peripheral countries joined the Euro, 
they were able to borrow at much lower interest rates than they otherwise would have 
been allowed without the internationally perceived security of the Euro.8  Additionally, 
the global recession induced states to support the financial sector and acquire public debt 
in order to ensure the continued functioning of the stock market, a move that switched the 
brunt of the crisis to the public sector in its second phase.  When states were no longer 
able to access international bond markets to the same extent, the insolvency threat 
followed.9 
 The Eurozone crisis was unprecedented in many ways.  Its large scale and rapid 
spread were remarkable.10  The resolution of the crisis has relied heavily upon the deep 
involvement of the EU and the IMF in debtor states’ finances, resulting in the potential 
for resentment by debtor states and expanded EU authority over member states’ finances, 
seen in the austerity requirements accompanying Greece’s bailouts.11  The primary crisis 
                                                 
6
 Lapavitsas et al., Crisis, ix, 54-6. 
7
 Lapavitsas et al., Crisis, 3. 
8
 Gibson, Hall, and Tavlas, “The Greek Financial Crisis,” 498-9. 
9
 Lapavitsas et al., Crisis, 54-6. 
10
 Paul De Grauwe, “Crisis in the Eurozone and How to Deal with It,” Centre for 
European Policy Studies, no. 204 (February 2010): 1, URL 4. 
11
 Chris Rogers and Sofia Vasilopoulou, “Making Sense of Greek Austerity,” The 
Political Quarterly 83, no. 4 (October–December 2012): 781-2, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
923X.2012.00000.x. 
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resolution mechanisms for economically failing states have been EU/IMF bailout 
packages and the requirements they entail.  The immense spread and depth of the 
economic crisis across Europe has differentiated it from crises contained within 
individual states and has impacted the prerogatives of international institutions tasked 
with resolving it. 
 Austerity has become the cornerstone of debt reduction agreements as the most 
critical conditionality imposed upon the debtor states in an effort to curtail their 
increasing debts.  It became the new buzzword of the year, and it was the main source of 
pain for the protesters on the streets of Athens.12 A program of increased taxes, decreased 
wages, and reductions in public spending, austerity began its rise to prominence in the 
Eurozone following the crisis as states made an effort to decrease their public debt 
obligations.13 Austerity has been adopted in some capacity by numerous states in the 
Eurozone in response to the financial crisis, with both core and peripheral states 
tightening their belts to weather the crisis.  In Portugal, Ireland, and Greece, it has been 
imposed from above as a conditionality of EU and IMF bailout packages.14  States such 
as Greece are projected to remain under austerity conditions for years to come before 
their debt issues are resolved, adding to the protesters’ pain. 
 Despite the complexity of the crisis, discussions of its causes often divide into two 
camps, with dramatically different interpretations of the events articulated by the debtors 
and the creditors.  Descriptions of the crisis encapsulate more than simple facts; they 
often reveal the underlying perceptions that EU states hold about one another.  The 
                                                 
12
 “Word of the Year 2010,” Merriam-Webster, December 20, 2012, URL 5. 
13
 Lapavitsas et al., Crisis, 7. 
14
 Lapavitsas et al., Crisis, 59-60. 
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“Northern diagnosis” of the problem often rests on a morality tale of the crisis.  This 
narrative claims that the profligacy and extravagance of Southern governments living 
beyond their means precipitated the sovereign debt crisis.  Such a conception of the 
events creates a dichotomy between saints and sinners in the economic system, often 
relies on stereotypes, and implies that the indebted states must be punished in some way 
to avoid further episodes of moral hazard and irresponsibility; that punishment in practice 
is austerity.15  The debtors, on the other hand, often point to the systemic issues in the 
structure of the Eurozone that allowed the series of events to unfold, although their 
framing of the crisis is not always free of stereotypes either, specifically stereotypes 
about Germans and other Northern governments.  Additionally, they critique austerity 
measures for punishing workers for their governments’ attempts to support the financial 
sector, whose speculation on the crisis worsened the situation.16  These two narratives of 
the crisis are critical to understanding the role of beliefs and rhetoric in the resolution 
process, as are the disagreements on the efficacy of austerity that have risen to 
prominence as a result of the crisis.  The range of opinions on austerity and the troika’s 
crisis resolution tactics, as well as the tension in the public discourse on the topic, reveal 
underlying views on European identity and integration, and they are critical to 
understanding the status of the European project today. 
  
                                                 
15
 Paul De Grauwe, “The Eurozone as a Morality Play,” Intereconomics 5 (2011): 230, 
doi: 10.1007/s10272-011-0388-1. 
16
 Lapavitsas et al., Crisis, 38-41. 
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Justification of Project and Case Study 
 Evidence of palpable anti-German anger in Greece is not difficult to uncover.  
Illustrations depicting German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Finance Minister 
Wolfgang Schäuble as Nazis circulated in the Greek media in early 2012, echoing Ms. 
Papafagou’s allusion to World War II and provoking uproar in Germany.17  An 
interesting question becomes, then, what caused Greece’s extreme response against 
Germany—was it simply the perception of too much German involvement in Greece’s 
debt crisis coupled with the historical memory of World War II, or were Greeks 
responding to negative sentiments coming from the creditor states? An advertisement for 
The Spectator, a conservative British magazine, displayed on trains and buses in the UK 
read: “Most Germans own a second property.  It’s called Greece.”18  The anti-Greek 
sentiment captured by this advertisement drove my interest in exploring the perceptions 
of wealthier EU states about Greeks.  My analysis presents an effort to investigate the 
roots of the Greek response and, through this response, the tensions between states in the 
EU. 
 The disagreement over the efficacy of austerity and the moralization over the crisis 
articulate the possibility that the framing of financial crisis narratives by wealthier states 
may point to underlying assumptions by actors in the Eurozone.  Reactions to bailouts 
and austerity may be investigated to reveal the public sentiments in play in the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis.  Understanding the intentions of the various actors involved in the 
resolution of the crisis is critical; with countries such as Germany playing major roles in 
                                                 
17
 “«Μη µας αποκαλείτε Ναζί» εκλιπαρεί η «Bild» µε αφορµή τα πρωτοσέλιδα της 
«δηµοκρατίας»,” Dimokratia News, February 15, 2012, URL 6. 
18
 The Spectator, accessed March 25, 2013, image available at: URL 7. 
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dictating the settlements offered to debtor states, it matters what EU states think of one 
another.  Because democratically elected leaders have to remain popular with their 
publics, public opinion and the media spin on the crisis likely affect the options leaders 
are willing to consider in order to resolve the crisis.19  In a politically hostile world, both 
financial assistance through bailouts and draconian austerity have come to be seen as the 
cure, and it is important to investigate why. 
 Coverage of the financial crisis reveals the way in which European national publics 
view one another, illuminating possible underlying tensions or doubts about the success 
of the integrative European project.  This perspective on public opinion provides an 
interesting look into the narrative of the crisis.  Using Greece’s sovereign debt crisis as a 
case study, I investigate the narratives of Greece’s financial woes presented by two non-
debtor states, Germany and Britain, as covered in four key media sources.  I chose 
Germany both because of my German language skills and the state’s role as the biggest 
economic power in the Eurozone; Germany has played a key role in the EU’s formation 
in the past and bailout negotiations in the present.20  Britain provides another interesting 
perspective given its history of resistance to European integration21—the country is a EU 
member but refused to take on the single currency, continuing to use the Pound instead of 
the Euro.  As a result, despite its prominent international position and economic strength, 
the state has not shared Germany’s prominent role in bailout negotiations.  Given their 
                                                 
19
 De Grauwe, “Morality Play,” 230-1. 
20
 Simon Bulmer and William E. Patterson, “Germany and the European Union: From 
‘Tamed Power’ to Normalized Power?” International Affairs 85, no. 5 (2010): 1051, 
1061, URL 8. 
21
 Oliver Daddow, “Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and the Eurosceptic Tradition in 
Britain,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15 (2012): 8-9, doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-856X.2012.00534.x. 
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different positions in the financial crisis resolution process and in the EU as a whole, a 
study of British and German media provides access to a range of opinions on the EU/IMF 
bailouts and overall orientations towards European integration held by citizens in non-
debtor states. 
 Greece is an ideal choice for a media case study on the sovereign debt crisis.  
Internationally, Greece has become synonymous with the Eurozone crisis22; media 
around the world have closely followed the events, likely a result of the extreme nature of 
the crisis, allowing national publics to form opinions and sustain interest on the topic. 
Greece is an outlier in terms of the extent of its crisis, the interest it has stimulated, and 
the degree of involvement of the international community in the response.  Since it joined 
the Euro in 2001, Greece’s position in the Eurozone has changed significantly.  Between 
December 2009 and May 2012, Greece announced its deep financial concerns, approved 
and received two EU/IMF-directed bailout packages, adopted draconian austerity 
measures, and suffered extensive riots and political opposition by those who disagreed 
with the handling of the crisis.  German news sources Bild and Die Zeit and British news 
sources The Sun and the Financial Times covered these events extensively, and they 
provide evidence about their national publics’ attitudes towards Greece, with deep 
implications for the success and the future of the European project. 
  
                                                 
22
 For more on Greece as a “trope,” see Daniel M. Knight, “The Desire to Blame Greece 
for the Eurocrisis Ensures that the Greek People Pay the Price, While the Elites 
Responsible Get Away Free,” London School of Economics and Political Science 
EUROPP, January 9, 2013, URL 9. 
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II. Research Question 
 The coverage of Greece’s financial crisis in widely circulated British and German 
news sources should provide an indicator of the leanings of each state’s national public.  
National opinion is important given the international power differential between states 
like Greece and more financially successful states, both in terms of international 
legitimacy and financial status.  Have German and British elite-level and popular-level 
news sources indicated bias against Greece in media coverage of the financial crisis, 
indicated by the use of stereotypes, positions on austerity, morality tales, oppositional 
distinctions drawn, and fear mongering? Is there a difference of opinion between Britain 
and Germany? If so, what drives the difference in opinion between the two states? Since 
both popular and elite news sources will be investigated, is there a difference between the 
two types of news sources in terms of financial crisis coverage, and what would such 
differences indicate about alignments patterns within the EU—what types of cleavages 
exist? What do these results mean for European integration both past and present—has it 
been successful thus far, for whom has it been a success, and will it be in the future? 
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III. Literature Review 
Roots of the Crisis and the Morality Tale 
 An important debate continues on the roots of the Greek debt crisis, with some 
sources blaming systemic factors, such as fiscal consolidation under the Euro and the 
structure of the EU, and others pointing to problems specific to Greece and the actions it 
took to bring about its own financial decline and ultimately the decline of others.  
Perspectives that view Greece as a symptom rather than the root of the crisis generally 
focus on the EU as the causal factor underlying the financial crisis.  Costas Lapavitsas 
and his collaborators investigate the effects of German dominance of the Eurozone and 
EU structure, illuminating the systemic issues that precipitated the crisis from a Marxist 
perspective.  Lapavitsas paints the crisis as a “detonator” for underlying issues rather than 
depicting the debt crisis itself as the ultimate cause for the problems in the Eurozone.23  
Criticizing member states’ public policies, Jürgen Habermas’ view is in accord with 
Lapavitsas’, arguing that the downturn shows the EU’s flaw of incomplete integration.  
Habermas thus blames the dissonant foreign and economic policies of member states, 
mirroring the neoliberal Giandomenico Majone’s emphasis on collective responsibility 
for the crisis, which views Greece as part of a larger broken system.24  Approaching the 
Euro and integration from a historical, often elite-focused perspective, David Marsh’s 
work provides important insight into the issues that conditioned the development of 
                                                 
23
 Lapavitsas et al., Crisis, x, xi. 
24
 Jürgen Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Process (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009), 
194-5. 
Giandomenico Majone, “Rethinking European Integration after the Debt Crisis,” UCL 
no. 3 (June 2012): 3, URL 10. 
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today’s Europe, furthering the macro-level analysis of the flawed EU system.25  EU-
centric narratives of what went wrong tend to absolve Greece of the ultimate blame, 
examining the crisis through a supranational institutional lens rather than a state-level 
one. 
 Others take a less forgiving approach towards the debtor states, focusing on their 
misdeeds instead of systemic flaws in the structure of the Union; such perspectives tend 
to be more critical of Greece specifically.  Some scholars have presented longer-term 
perspectives on the development of Greece’s problems (Gibson, et al, 2012; Bitros, 
2013).  Tracking the issues in Greece over time and providing a longer-term perspective, 
Heather D. Gibson et al. and George C. Bitros analyze the buildup to the Greek crisis 
from 1950 onwards and since its entry into the Eurozone, respectively, furthering the 
understanding of Greece’s specific context.26  Others have focused more on the 
proximate causes of the crisis (Ortiz, 2012; De Grauwe, 2010).  Guillermo Ortiz and Paul 
De Grauwe exemplify the debtor-focused perspective, emphasizing the structural issues 
within the debtor states as the primary cause of the crisis and addressing the need for 
reform from within to resolve the current issues.27  Such approaches often inherently 
attribute more blame to Greece in the crisis. 
 I will not attempt to evaluate which narrative of the overarching crisis is more 
accurate, save for the assumption that the global financial crisis had many plausible 
causes and underlying factors, and the two perspectives often complement one another 
                                                 
25
 David Marsh, The Euro (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
26
 Gibson, Hall, and Tavlas, “The Greek Financial Crisis,” 498. 
27
 Guillermo Ortiz, “The False Dilemma between Austerity and Growth,” in “Think Tank 
20: New Challenges for the Global Economy, New Uncertainties for the G-20,” The 
Brookings Institution (June 2012): 63, URL 11. 
De Grauwe, “How to Deal with It,” 1. 
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when both are provided.  Thus, when one narrative is selected over the other and blame is 
assigned, media sources make a deliberate choice; the perceived roots of the financial 
crisis in media coverage and how these issues are framed are critical aspects of my 
analysis because the prevailing narrative within the more powerful states can be taken as 
an indicator of their perceptions of the debtor states, regardless of the degree of 
truthfulness of a certain characterization. 
 More pertinent to my project than perspectives on who should take the blame for 
the crisis are the effects of blame-assigning views on the framing of crisis narratives—in 
other words: who is being blamed? One logical development of theories that focus on the 
responsibility that Greece bears due to its governmental misconduct is the morality tale, a 
critical concept in discussions of EU states’ perceptions of one another in the financial 
crisis.28  De Grauwe has discussed the influence of economic morality on the response to 
the crisis, arguing that news source depictions of the crisis are crucial to the development 
of policy solutions due to their influence on public sentiment in states such as Germany 
and the Netherlands.29  He asserts that the “moralistic attitude” developed by the 
Northern states is in fact hampering crisis resolution efforts since the focus is on 
punishment rather than assistance of other Eurozone states.30  One can see in his 
description how a focus on Greek government misconduct can turn into a discussion of 
government profligacy that requires punishment for sins rather than a dialogue on the 
best economic solutions.31  Similarly, Wonhyuk Lim has criticized the prevalence of the 
                                                 
28
 It is important to note that not all narratives that focus on Greece’s misconduct result in 
morality tale narratives; the morality tale is just one possible development.  
29
 De Grauwe, “Morality Play,” 230-1. 
30
 De Grauwe, “Morality Play,” 231. 
31
 De Grauwe, “Morality Play,” 230. 
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morality tale and its alleged ignorance of critical underlying economic factors, arguing 
that such depictions of the crisis do not fully encompass the truth, ultimately damaging 
recovery efforts.32  Beliefs play a major role in Eurozone crisis resolution efforts; 
Abraham Newman’s work focuses on Germany’s ideological background and examines 
how its beliefs have been influential in the crisis, realizing that ideologies condition 
perceptions of interests and therefore preferred policy outcomes33; a belief in the morality 
tale could have a dramatic impact on Germany’s desired financial crisis resolution 
mechanisms.  Again, for the project at hand, the critical aspect of the morality tale is not 
its accuracy in encompassing the true facts of the crisis, but rather whether and how it has 
been employed in depictions of the crisis in the wealthier EU states. 
 
The Importance and Efficacy of Austerity 
 Accompanying discussions of what precipitated the financial crisis comes a 
debate on the efficacy of austerity in alleviating the pain of financial downturns as well as 
commentary on the hidden costs it may have in the specific case of the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis.  As more time passes since the onset of the crisis, more nuanced 
research on the effects of austerity in the specific case of the Eurozone has begun to 
emerge.  While it appears to be the accepted course of action by the troika, critics of 
Greek austerity abound (Krugman, 2012; De Grauwe, 2013).  Some economists disagree 
                                                 
32
 Wonhyuk Lim, “Déjà Vu All over Again: The Depressing Debate on the Financial 
Crisis and Democratic Politics,” in “Think Tank 20: New Challenges for the Global 
Economy, New Uncertainties for the G-20,” The Brookings Institution (June 2012): 60, 
URL 11. 
33
 Abraham L. Newman, “Flight from Risk: Unified Germany and the Role of Beliefs in 
the European Response to the Financial Crisis,” German Politics and Society 28, no. 2 
(2010): 154-5, doi: 10.3167/gps.2010.280210. 
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with the notion that there is a tradeoff between GDP growth and reigning in spending, but 
others question the motivation behind the imposition of austerity, debating the moral 
overtones of the discussion and casting doubt on austerity’s ability to help at all.34  Neo-
Keynesian Paul Krugman has been a prominent doubter of the austerity efforts, arguing 
that they will do more harm than good in the end and that government spending is a 
critical aspect of states avoiding deeper recessions.35  Similarly criticizing the dangers of 
austerity, Giancarlo Corsetti’s Centre for Economic Policy report and De Grauwe’s work 
explore the potentially harmful side effects of too much austerity on recovering states.36  
Even the IMF’s groundbreaking October 2012 World Economic Outlook calls for a 
reevaluation of austerity as the knee-jerk reaction to debt crisis, as it posits that the fiscal 
multiplier was underestimated and that the effect of austerity may be even deeper 
recession; the IMF report includes an economic analysis of austerity measures, but it does 
not explore the social implications of austerity, another critical aspect of the aftermath of 
the Eurozone crisis.37  Others have examined the dangers and failures of Eurozone 
austerity measures in adequately addressing the social impact of the crisis (Lapavitsas, et 
al, 2012; Monastiriotis, 2011).  The far-reaching effects of economic underperformance 
                                                 
34
 Ortiz, “The False Dilemma,” 63. 
De Grauwe, “Morality Play,” 230. 
35
 Paul Krugman, “Europe’s Austerity Madness,” New York Times, September 27, 2012, 
URL 12. 
36
 Giancarlo Corsetti, ed., “Austerity: Too Much of a Good Thing? A VoxEU.org 
eCollection of Views by Leading Economists,” Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(2012), URL 13. 
37
 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook: Coping with High Debt and 
Sluggish Growth,” (October 2012): 40. 
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on vulnerable groups range from high unemployment to the creation of deep social 
divisions.38 
 The adoption of austerity packages can also be examined in light of the political 
process of the EU.  Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein’s assessment of European 
identity as a politicized concept can be adapted to fit the bailout process—it is possible 
that austerity has become a similarly politicized phenomenon.39  Consent is an important 
aspect of the political process; the Greek financial crisis resolution process required the 
agreement of the EU and the IMF, in addition to member states and Greece, leading to 
contentious debates on the bailouts (Clarke and Newman, 2012).  Given the nature of 
democratic political systems, politicians were in the position of having to convince the 
general population of the acceptability of bailout funds, adding further conflict to the 
process.40  An understanding of the debates surrounding austerity and the incentives for 
its use are important in an assessment of its level of support by national publics and 
leaders, offering a possible perspective on states’ perceptions of one another.  I do not 
seek to evaluate whether or not the adoption of austerity packages by Greece was in fact 
advisable or the best possible solution, but rather what the importance of the narrative 
surrounding their adoption in non-debtor states was given the reliance on austerity as a 
cornerstone of the bailout packages in Greece. 
                                                 
38
 Lapavitsas et al., Crisis, 182. 
Vassilis Monastiriotis, “Making Geographical Sense of the Greek Austerity Measures: 
Compositional Effects and Long-Run Implications,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy, and Society 4, no. 3 (2011): 323-337, doi: 10.1093/cjres/rsr026. 
Habermas, The Faltering Process, 184. 
39
 Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, European Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
40
 John Clarke and Janet Newman, “The Alchemy of Austerity” Critical Social Policy 32, 
no. 3 (2012): 299-319, doi: 10.1177/0261018312444405. 
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The Impact on European Integration  
 Debates on the level of European integration existed before the financial crisis 
and continue in light of it, questioning who is being integrated and by whom, as well as 
what the effect of the crisis on future integration will be.  The success of integration is 
often divided into an elite perspective and a mass perspective, and some scholars argue 
that European integration is an elite-driven process (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; 
Haas, 1968; Habermas, 2009).41  Checkel and Katzenstein differentiate between the 
shaping of cosmopolitan and populist conceptions of European identity and trace the 
opposite directions in which elite and mass politics have traveled with regard to European 
identity.42  Ernst B. Haas focuses his top-down approach on the theory of 
neofunctionalism, a branch of integration theory that argues that sectors integrate as it 
becomes advantageous to do so.43  Habermas laments the state of the EU and its elite-
driven progress, calling it an “elitist and bureaucratic” institution with a serious 
democratic deficit44; in Perry Anderson’s words, “The elites do not persuade the masses; 
but, to all appearances, they have little to fear from them.”45 
 For the scholars who view European integration as an elite-driven process, a 
hallmark of successful European integration would be a sense of European solidarity 
between national publics, a popular-level phenomenon, as opposed to negative 
perceptions of one another and stereotyping.  Thus, national publics’ beliefs about one 
                                                 
41
 Checkel and Katzenstein, European Identity, 7. 
42
 Checkel and Katzenstein, European Identity, 13. 
43
 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-
1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 313-17. 
44
 Habermas, The Faltering Process, 80. 
45
 Perry Anderson, The New Old World (London: Verso, 2009), 63. 
 21
another are important in evaluating the level of integration, as well as the impact that the 
financial crisis has had on the European project.46  The existence of stereotypes held by 
national publics in member states about one another would indicate a problem in 
integration at the popular level; a lack of solidarity between German, British, and Greek 
national publics during the financial crisis, exemplified by stereotypical and negative 
views about Greeks and certain characterizations of the roots of the financial crisis, 
would provide evidence that integration has not succeeded at the popular level.  A survey 
of common stereotypes about Greece would be useful in establishing what aspects of 
news coverage would indicate bias against Greeks, but the literature on Greek stereotypes 
specifically is not extensive.  Southern Mediterranean cultures in general are 
characterized as warm and “excitement-seeking,” with additional helpful stereotypes 
coming from common knowledge47; in popular conceptions, Greeks, Spaniards, and 
Italians are often depicted as happy-go-lucky, carefree, and lazy.  Evidence of such 
stereotypes about Greeks would indicate significant bias against Greeks in news 
coverage, and it is thus important to look for indications of such views.  Conceptions of 
Greek stereotypes and European identity are critical to my project due to the necessity of 
states helping one another to resolve the crisis—if they identify with and respect one 
another, they will be more likely to agree to assist each other than if they view fellow 
member states negatively or as “others.”48 
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 The financial crisis may have various implications for the future of European 
integration and for the EU as a whole.  Even before the full scope of the effects of the 
global financial crisis became clear, Perry Anderson described the EU in its current state 
as built on “political quicksands” because of the degree of uncertainty regarding its 
future.49  Some argue that the crisis has resulted in an institutional deepening of 
integration; common examples include the Outright Monetary Transactions, the bailout 
fund, and the new precedent set despite the “no bailout clause,” Article 125 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union.50  Others argue that the result has been a 
movement away from further integration (Newman, 2012; Majone, 2012); Newman cites 
Germany’s caution and conservatism in agreeing to assist member states financially in 
contrast with its previously more cooperative stance on EU integration efforts, and 
Majone points to polling data indicating EU citizens’ lack of desire for further 
integration.51  While some pin the blame for the crisis on too much integration, seen in 
some Germans’ longing for a return to the D-Mark, others argue that the problem was 
that the EU is not integrated enough.52  The EU is economically halfway integrated as a 
monetary and not a fiscal union, which some argue prevented effective crisis resolution 
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and threatens further economic development in the Eurozone.53  Perspectives on the 
future of European integration are important as a measure of the backlash or reaction to 
the financial crisis with regard to how much EU states want to be involved with one 
another; it is possible that the crisis demonstrates the inefficacy of the concept of 
European solidarity as a whole when it comes to resolving high-stakes issues and that the 
systemic integration of the past in fact accelerated the breakdown of solidarity by making 
a large-scale Eurozone crisis possible. 
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IV. Hypothesis 
 I posit that the British and German popular and elite coverage of the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis presents an accurate picture of the leanings of each state’s national 
public.  I hypothesize that both British and German news sources will indicate bias 
against Greece in financial crisis coverage, although likely with important differences; 
both will, however, include stereotypes, the recommendation of austerity as a 
punishment, morality tales, an absence of solidarity, and fear mongering.  I predict a 
difference between the two given Germany’s status as a member of the Eurozone, while 
Britain is an EU member that does not participate in the single currency; I also predict 
distinctions between elite and popular coverage given the different relationships elites 
and masses have to the project of European integration.  Media depictions of the financial 
crisis in Greece have become loaded with language that holds significant implications for 
the underlying political attitudes of each source’s readership, and they are a crucial link 
in understanding the alignment of national publics in the EU in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. 
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V. Sources of Evidence 
 The bulk of my evidence comes from British and German elite and popular news 
sources The Sun, the Financial Times, Bild, and Die Zeit.  The sort of language and 
rhetoric employed will indicate the type of relationship that the people of each state 
perceive themselves to have with their Greek counterparts.  I selected The Sun and the 
Financial Times as my British sources because of their extensive circulation.  The 
Financial Times is regarded as the world’s preeminent economics-focused newspaper 
published in English; its reputation precedes it as the relied-upon news source for 
English-speaking financial elites, especially in Europe.  As the most widely circulated 
British tabloid, The Sun is a relied-upon news source for a very different demographic, 
and the quintessential tabloid encapsulates popular coverage in Britain.  Die Zeit and Bild 
were selected for similar reasons.  While the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s readership 
in Germany exceeds that of Die Zeit, online resource constraints precluded my use of the 
FAZ as my German elite news source; however, Die Zeit is also widely circulated and 
highly respected, and its readership parallels FAZ in terms of its elite status.  Bild is 
Germany’s most popular tabloid and thus offers a glimpse into the popular coverage of 
the financial crisis in Germany. 
 Since I argue that perceptions of one another are critical to an understanding of the 
impact of the morality narrative on proposed solutions, public opinion polling data such 
as the Eurobarometer and the Pew Global Attitudes Project will be an important facet of 
my analysis.  The Eurobarometer data, with its frequent qualitative and quantitative 
studies of EU citizens, allows public opinion to be tracked over the course of the financial 
crisis, providing insights into the effects it has had across several time periods on 
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European identity and other factors that may indicate the degree of opposition and 
competition citizens within the Eurozone may feel toward one another.54  The Pew 
Global Attitudes Project similarly tracks EU citizens and their perceptions of one another, 
focusing more on the attitudes that the publics of different states have of one another 
rather than on their perceptions of the EU and its institutions, illuminating many of the 
stereotypes and assumptions that citizens of different countries hold about one another, 
an important factor in the crisis’ aftermath.55  Public opinion polling links the evidence 
offered by news sources and the professed beliefs of EU citizens.  The relationship 
between the two will reinforce my analysis of media sources. 
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VI. Public Opinion: Media Content Analysis 
Methodology 
 In order to investigate how the financial crisis in Greece was reported in the 
wealthier EU states, I searched for the presence of five core indicators of negative Greek 
perceptions in German and British coverage in the weeklong period both preceding and 
following three crucial moments in Greece’s financial crisis.  My search terms were 
“Greek” and “Greece” (in German, “Griechen” and “Griechenland”).  The first moment, 
December 3, 2009 to December 17, 2009, is indicative of the time that the Greek 
government officially announced that it was in dire fiscal straits. The second moment 
used, April 25, 2010 to May 9, 2010, is the period around the date the first Greek 
EU/IMF bailout package was announced.  The third moment, February 14, 2012 to 
February 28, 2012, comprises the weeks around the second Greek bailout.  A total of 561 
articles were considered in my analysis.  While a more exhaustive study would cover the 
entire duration of the financial crisis, this study was limited by time and resource 
constraints and thus is restricted to the one-week periods immediately before and after 
three key events; it does not, however, include all of the important moments in the crisis, 
including various austerity packages, turning points for other Eurozone states, and the 
aftermath and lingering effects of important events, as well as moments that, while 
perhaps less critical than bailout packages, would provide insight into the psychology 
behind the voting publics.  All such moments would contribute to a more complete 
picture of the perceptions present in German and British news sources.  The news sources 
used were deliberately from both popular and elite press.  For German elite coverage, the 
center-left publication Die Zeit was used, and popular coverage came from the right-
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leaning Bild, the widely circulated tabloid-style publication.  British elite coverage comes 
from the prominent centrist economics-oriented Financial Times, while popular coverage 
comes from the widely read conservative tabloid The Sun.   
 The five evaluative factors attempt to code systematically and organize any 
negative perceptions in Britain and Germany.  The first coding decision is defined by the 
presence or absence of stereotypes about Greeks.  Possible stereotypes commonly held 
about Greeks and residents of other Mediterranean states specifically relevant to the crisis 
include laziness, a propensity to lie and cheat, untrustworthiness, and a fun-loving nature, 
as well as a general broad-brush painting of Greeks as bankrupt or hopeless.  The second 
coding decision confirms whether the news source claims that austerity specifically is in 
some way deserved as part of a punishment structure for perceived Greek misdeeds in the 
past.  The third coding decision is a little more complex.  I looked for the presence of an 
“us versus them” mentality (as opposed to a solidarity orientation) in the news sources, a 
direct mobilization of the relevant paper’s national public against the Greek public 
through various mechanisms, including negatively contrasting economic performance, 
stating that the crisis is a Greek problem that Greeks must solve, and drawing any 
xenophobic distinctions between the two groups.  The fourth coding decision is the 
presence or absence of a moral narrative of the financial crisis, for example that the 
Greeks brought this upon themselves by spending too much, being dependent on the 
public sector, and other allegations of fraud, corruption, and waste.  The fifth coding 
decision searched for is the presence of a palpable sense of fear or the inclusion of fear-
mongering language in the publications, a factor that captured reluctance to pay for 
bailouts, the dread of an impending deeper crisis, as well as sensationalist language in 
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describing the protest movements.  The analysis of these five moments in the 
development of the Eurozone financial crisis provides evidence as to whether the British 
and German newspapers display a sense of European solidarity or resort to historic or 
customary “national character” analysis. 
 Some cross-sections of each state’s national public are missed by the 
methodology of this study.  By reading elite-oriented and mass-appeal publications, it is 
possible that a significant middle ground may be overlooked; the wide-circulation of both 
types of papers indicates that such a study gives a reasonably good overview of the 
German and British public’s beliefs, but not all views are being included.  In order to 
focus on relevant coverage, only articles that specifically discuss the financial crisis in 
Greece were read.  While one-line mentions of Greece are often used insultingly or to 
illustrate a worst-case scenario, they were excluded in order to focus on the goal of 
understanding the biased nature of financial crisis coverage.  A more general study would 
search for anti-Greek perceptions in all British and German coverage, but this study 
primarily concerns itself with the news’ narrative of the financial crisis specifically, an 
orientation that may exclude an important angle on overall perceptions of Greece. 
 
Moment 1: Greeks Bearing Debts56, December 3-17, 2009 
 On December 10, 2009, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou admitted that 
Greece’s debts were the highest that they had ever been in its history and that Greece 
needed financial help, simultaneously promising large-scale restructuring of the Greek 
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economic and social system.  Greece’s credit rating was downgraded first by Fitch with 
more to follow, and there was significant protesting across Greece.  Initially, the riots 
were nominally in remembrance of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, a young protester killed 
by a Greek police officer the year before, but they were inextricably linked to Greece’s 
financial decline and the general unrest of the population facing imminent crisis, turning 
violent as protestors clashed with police and discussions about austerity measures began.  
While murmurs of financial issues existed before the official announcement, December 
10, 2009 marks the point at which even those not particularly interested in the financial 
goings-on of a small Mediterranean state in the periphery of the Eurozone had their 
interest peaked; thus, the period of December 3, 2009 to December 17, 2009 is used to 
analyze news coverage of this period. 
 Unifying themes that arose in the reading of the four sources in the first moment 
include an emphasis on Greek dishonesty in adopting the single currency, a deep interest 
in the rising social unrest in the state, questions about the efficacy of the Euro, and 
intense uncertainty about the future of the economic system as the Eurozone crisis began 
to unfold. 
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Bild 
Bild Moment 1 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 2  17 10 83 
Austerity deserved 1 8 11 92 
Us vs. Them 5 42 7 58 
Moral narrative 2 17 10 83 
Fear 8 67 4 33 
 
 In the first moment, Bild published twelve articles relevant to the Greek financial 
crisis with some significant indicators of negativity towards Greece and its people.  Most 
significantly, 42% of the articles placed Greece and Germany in opposition to one 
another, displaying an “us versus them” mentality, and two thirds of the articles made use 
of sensationalist language or fear.  As details about Greece’s situation began to be known, 
Bild consistently described the debtor states (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Italy) 
as “time bombs,” implying that the worst had not yet come.57  The riots in Greece were 
covered in sensationalist language; rioters were described as “hoodlums,” “anarchists,” 
and “leftist extremists,” emphasizing “chaos” and “fear,” and the riots themselves were 
alleged to be reminiscent of a civil war.58  Bild contrasted Greece’s economic problems 
with Germany’s 2009 end-of-year economic performance, which it described as an 
“employment miracle,” apparently drawing an intentional distinction between the two 
states in terms of performance.59  What began as smaller hints of distinctions being drawn 
between debtor and creditor states evolved fully within days, peaking with an openly 
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hostile headline that asked, “Are Greeks and Spaniards Ruining the Euro?”60 Soon after 
the Greek government’s announcement, coverage became inundated with negative 
stereotypes, although only two articles in the period, or 17%, utilized stereotypes.  
Germany was described as the “purse” that might be financially responsible for their 
actions, and Bild showed an intense fear of financial obligations on the part of Germany.  
Greece was described as on the verge of collapse directly because of its unsound 
budgetary policy; it was also suggested that financially suffering states accepting bailout 
funds from the IMF would tarnish the image of the “proud Europeans” of the EU as a 
whole.61  Most prominently, Bild began to mention regularly that Greece lied to get into 
the Eurozone, asking, “But can the Greeks really be trusted? They hide, they trick, they 
cheat….” The deception used by Greece in order to enter the Eurozone was treated as a 
root cause of the financial crisis.  Additionally, the emergence of the crisis was attributed 
to corruption in the country was specifically mentioned in discussions of how the crisis 
came to be, employing another negative characterization of Greek people in general—the 
conflation of the public and its politicians.62  Discussions about austerity were not yet 
prominent, and only one article indicated that austerity was deserved, stating that Greece 
must be tough now given its past deception, yet another allusion to Greece’s entry into 
the Eurozone.63  Bild in the beginning of December 2009 expressed an increasingly 
negative attitude towards Greece, and its escalating negative perspective over the two-
week period indicated potential for a deepening of its attitude as the crisis progressed. 
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Die Zeit 
Zeit Moment 1 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 1  13 7 88 
Austerity deserved 1 13 7 88 
Us vs. Them 0 0 8 100 
Moral narrative 0 0 8 100 
Fear 1 13 7 88 
 
 During the first period, Die Zeit published eight articles relevant to the Greek 
financial crisis, and its articles were largely neutral or positive.  In contrast with the 
coverage in Bild, the coverage in Die Zeit did not indicate significant underlying 
negativity towards Greece.  It employed very little negative language regarding Greece, 
with only two articles displaying stereotypes, the idea that Greeks deserve austerity, or a 
sense of fear.  While one article referred to the protesters as “Randalierer,” a word with 
negative implications that translates as “hooligan,” Die Zeit included the protesters’ 
perspective, refrained from sensationalizing the events, and was more content to discuss 
the management of the Euro and the possible effects of the crisis rather than the 
perceived personal failings of Greeks.64  It did, however, mention Greece’s “notorisch 
unzuverlässigen… Statistiken,” or “notoriously unreliable statistics,” an allusion to the 
Greek government’s dishonest presentation of its public finances when it entered the 
Eurozone.65  The implication that Greek data has a reputation for unreliability draws on 
stereotypical assumptions about Greece’s national character.  However, instead of 
lingering on anti-Greek stereotypes in its coverage of the early December 2009 period, 
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Die Zeit feared the lack of spending on education and the creation of a lost generation in 
Greece.66  Overall, the paper in this period was largely sympathetic to Greece’s plight, 
even mentioning that Germany and other wealthy states have continued to benefit from 
Greece’s participation in the Euro.  It also alleged that Robert Mundell, who spoke out in 
favor of a fiscal union coupled with a monetary union, was correct, a compassionate 
stance towards Greeks and an indication that the beginning of the Eurozone crisis did not 
instinctively cause Die Zeit to oppose further European integration67; no mention was 
made about a fear of Germans ultimately being financially responsible for Greeks and 
their mistakes, for example.  While Die Zeit was not completely free of statements that 
indicated bias against Greece, the paper’s tone remained objective and lacked the 
personal attacks and sensationalism found in Bild in the same period, a strong indication 
that Die Zeit’s readership would not be sympathetic to such an orientation towards 
Greece. 
 
The Sun 
Sun Moment 1 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 0 0 2 100 
Austerity deserved 0 0 2 100 
Us vs. Them 0 0 2 100 
Moral narrative 0 0 2 100 
Fear 1 50 1 50 
 
 The Sun in the first moment had a small sample size of articles relevant to the 
Greek financial crisis, with only two covering the events, likely because of the peripheral 
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nature of Greece at the time from the point of view of a large state in the EU but not in 
the Eurozone.  The lack of coverage most probably stemmed from the corresponding lack 
of interest the British public had in events that were still so far away, especially given 
Britain’s non-membership in the Euro.  The paper thus covered the events neutrally, even 
sympathetically to Greece, focusing on the Euro’s role in bringing about the crisis and 
displaying only fear at the potential for a widespread crisis that would affect the UK 
directly.68  The Sun entirely avoided the use of stereotypes, any commentary on austerity 
as a punishment for Greece, a moralizing attitude about the crisis, and it even alleged in a 
headline, “Euro prompts Greek economic tragedy,” overtly assigning blame for the crisis 
on the single currency, not the Greek state.69  The Sun showed the beginnings of anti-
European sentiments in its knee-jerk blame of the Euro, but it refrained from directly 
contrasting the Greek and British national publics despite the slightly sensationalized fear 
of an approaching recession, the marker of an “us versus them” orientation70; while there 
was a lack of European solidarity, The Sun did not demonize Greeks.  The paper’s lack of 
initial interest in the Greek financial crisis shows the preoccupation of its readership with 
other issues with the potential to affect them more directly, and The Sun thus remained 
neutral in its commentary on the events of December 2009. 
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Financial Times 
FT Moment 1 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 20  22 71 78 
Austerity deserved 1 1 91 99 
Us vs. Them 0 0 91 100 
Moral narrative 9 10 82 90 
Fear 0 0 91 100 
 
 The Financial Times published more exhaustive coverage of the events for a 
British and wider European audience more interested and educated in the nuances of 
Eurozone economic developments; ninety-one articles were specifically relevant to the 
events in Greece, and they displayed interesting bias patterns at the elite level.  The 
Financial Times in this period was entirely lacking in articles that juxtaposed the British 
public against the Greek one or that used sensational language to stir fears in its 
readership, with no articles registering in these two categories.  Only one Financial Times 
article implied that “Spartan austerity” was a deserved or appropriate punishment for 
Greece’s past sins.71  However, 22% of its articles employed stereotypes and negative or 
biased language to characterize Greece, reverting to negativity to report on events with 
some regularity.  Greeks were cast as lacking credibility, dishonest, “irresponsible,” rule-
breakers, and “riddled with corruption.”72  Greeks were described as a people with a 
“hubris” problem “living beyond its means” in a corrupt state “cooking its books,” with 
disastrous results for the global financial system.73  A recurring theme was an emphasis 
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on Greece’s dishonesty in its entry into the Eurozone, as many Financial Times articles 
returned to the faulty statistics that allowed Greece’s budgetary problems to go officially 
undetected for so long, leading to a narrative about Greece’s “credibility deficit,” which 
drew on similar stereotypes of dishonesty.74  While Greek Prime Minister Papandreou 
coined the “credibility deficit” language in a speech, the phrase took on a more negative 
implication in the international press when divorced from Papandreou’s accompanying 
hope for the future of Greece.  Similarly, the allegation of “Greek profligacy” appeared 
prominently in the Financial Times in this period in discussing the roots of the crisis.75  
Closely tied to the profligacy narrative, ten percent of the Financial Times’ articles 
relating to Greece in this period presented a moral narrative of the crisis.  Commentary on 
the “moral hazard,” including some by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European 
Central Bank, discussed the risk of “rewarding irresponsible behaviour” and pointed to 
the simplistic causal explanation sometimes favored by the Financial Times: Greeks 
spent too much money and, as a result, caused the financial crisis.76  Discussions on 
Greece’s need to “slash spending” also often resulted in a moralizing tone and 
explanation for the crisis.77  While the Financial Times’ reliance on stereotypes was 
higher than one might expect in high level, economics-oriented paper, the types of 
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negative language it used were often intrinsically tied to the moral explanation for the 
crisis it sometimes employed, resulting in close links between the two categories.  The 
Financial Times’ coverage of the December 2009 period, while not sensational or 
divisive regarding national publics, relied on underlying negative biases in its frequent 
characterizations of the Greek national character and its moralizing tone regarding the 
crisis, resulting in some indication of negativity towards Greece. 
 
Moment 2: A Herculean Labor78, April 25-May 9, 2010 
 Just five months after Greece’s initial announcement of the extent of its financial 
woes, a bailout package from the EU and the IMF was approved for Greece.  On May 2, 
2010, Eurozone ministers finalized Greece’s first bailout package, totaling €110 billion, a 
massive sum that caused significant unease in the international media.  Both German and 
British news sources reacted to the unprecedented bailout, and the finance ministers’ 
agreement was an impressive feat in the face of the worsening situation in Greece and the 
diverse opinions within each state; for Greece, it began a process of Herculean labors as it 
attempted to resurface from the pile of debts under which it found itself, paying penance 
with stringent austerity measures and restructuring within its financial system.  The 
second period covers articles published from April 25, 2010 to May 9, 2010.  This period 
captures the final negotiations surrounding the size of the package and how much 
member states would contribute, as well as the aftermath of its approval by the Eurozone 
finance ministers and the beginning of the approval process in individual member states. 
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 The first bailout raised many questions in the British and German media, and it 
brought to light concerns about the extent of European integration and solidarity, the 
costs and benefits of the single currency, and fears for the future given the rising concerns 
about other states’ finances, as well as intense scrutiny on Greece’s public sector system 
and the causal mechanisms behind the crisis. 
 
Bild 
Bild Moment 2 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 23  40 35 60 
Austerity deserved 8 14 50 86 
Us vs. Them 14 24 44 76 
Moral narrative 14 24 44 76 
Fear 16 28 42 72 
 
 Bild in the second moment had a tenfold increase in the quantity of articles it 
published about the Greek debt crisis; because the 115 relevant articles surpassed the 
threshold of 100 articles per two-week period, every other article was read for a total of 
58.  An astonishing forty percent of the Bild articles in this period employed negative 
stereotypes and language about Greeks.  Bild adopted “Pleite-Griechen,” or “bankrupt 
Greeks” as a constantly recurring epithet for Greeks79; it is important to note that Greece 
has not declared bankruptcy.  The paper raged against “Bankrotteure und Luxusrenten, 
Steuerhinterzieher und Abzocker,” “bankruptcies and luxury pensions, tax evaders and 
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cheaters” in a state that it alleged needed billions of Euros to stay afloat while its citizens 
kept partying—“Feierlaune ade!” “Goodbye, party mood!” Bild proclaimed in one article 
on Greece’s hardships.80  Another phrase that the paper adopted into common use was 
“Fass ohne Boden,” or “bottomless pit,” an allegation about the perceived uselessness of 
helping Greece financially.81  Bild also often reverted to discussions on Greece’s entry to 
the Eurozone, alleging that Greece “getrickst, getarnt, getäuscht,” or “tricked, disguised, 
and deceived” to acquire the single currency.82  Bild was more vocal in this period about 
austerity as a punishment mechanism for Greece, and fourteen percent of its articles 
specifically mentioned austerity in this capacity.  Greeks, it asserted, should be punished 
with “harte Strafen,” or “harsh penalties,” and pay the price for living beyond their 
means.83  Twenty-four percent of the articles in this period unfavorably contrasted Greeks 
with Germans, and one article referred to Greece as the “Problemkind Nummer eins,” or 
“problem child number one.”84  A moral explanation of the crisis was offered in 24% 
percent of Bild’s articles.  The financial crisis was bluntly alleged to be their fault, not the 
fault of speculators who had been causing problems in the Eurozone85; Greeks were 
referred to as “Euro-Sünder,” or “Euro-sinners,” combining direct language about sin and 
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punishment with a moral narrative.86  Bild also often sensationalized events in order to 
drum up fear, a tactic it used in 28% of its articles in this period.  Prominently featured 
was a deep fear that Germans would ultimately have to pay for Greece and never getting 
their money back.87  Bild also sensationally predicted a crash and end of the Euro and the 
EU.88  The paper in the late April to early May 2010 period revealed significant anti-
Greek bias across all five indicators, and the negativity of its language and rhetoric were 
noteworthy. 
 
Die Zeit 
Zeit Moment 2 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 11  19 46 81 
Austerity deserved 8 14 49 86 
Us vs. Them 6 11 51 89 
Moral narrative 12 21 45 79 
Fear 1 2 56 98 
 
 Die Zeit in the second moment published 113 articles on the Greek debt crisis; 
thus, 57 were read for the purposes of this analysis.  The paper did reveal several of the 
core indicators of bias, especially the use of stereotypes and moral narratives in addition 
to some allegations of austerity as a punishment and an “us versus them” mentality, but a 
reading of the articles presents a more complicated picture of Die Zeit’s orientation 
towards Greece.  While many articles did contain bias against Greece, the paper did not 
hesitate to criticize Germany.  The paper criticized Germany’s leadership for its 
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hesitation in bringing about a debt deal, calling its behavior irresponsible for reverting to 
“atavistischer Vorurteile,” or “atavistic prejudices” in the negotiations.89  It also strongly 
fostered a pro-integration position with many calls to European solidarity, reminding its 
readers of the degree to which Germany profited from the Euro and the many reasons 
behind the Eurozone crisis.90  Most significantly, Die Zeit indicated deep frustration with 
news coverage of the financial crisis by other German papers; it accused Bild, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Die Welt of stoking anti-Greek resentment.91  Still, 
the German paper employed stereotyping and moralizing in its coverage of the first 
bailout process.  The paper asserted that nobody wants to be responsible for Greece’s 
“Lügen and Maßlosigkeiten,” or “lies and excesses” and that money should only be given 
under strict controls and with painful austerity.92  Similarly, Greeks were accused of 
having a “verschwenderischen Lebensstil,” or a “wasteful lifestyle” with unnecessary 
comforts, and a Greek was quoted describing Greeks before the financial crisis as 
“feiernde, Teller werfende,” and “ungezügelte,” or “partying, plate-throwing, and 
untamed.”93  Distinctions were drawn between the core and the periphery, and the paper 
published articles asserting different philosophies as the cause of the divide and that 
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Greeks should be “schwedischer,” or “more Swedish” in order to weather the crisis.94  
Despite Die Zeit’s predisposition to defend European integration and solidarity, it still 
often relied on stereotypes biases against Greeks in its news coverage of the first bailout, 
discussing Greece in the same manner in which it criticized other German news sources. 
 
The Sun 
Sun Moment 2 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 4  29 10 71 
Austerity deserved 0 0 14 100 
Us vs. Them 1 7 13 93 
Moral narrative 1 7 13 93 
Fear 6 43 8 57 
 
 The Sun in the second period published fourteen relevant articles to the Greek 
financial crisis, an increase from the previous period that indicated more interest on the 
part of its readership regarding the events in the peripheral Mediterranean state.  A 
significant percentage of its articles in the second moment employed stereotypes or 
negative language (29%) or sensationalism to aggravate fear in its readership (43%).  
Greeks were described both as “angry” and living “enviably costly lives in the sunshine,” 
characterizations drawing on negative national stereotypes of Greeks as fiery-tempered 
but laid-back.95  Similarly alluding to perceived Greek laziness, The Sun drew attention to 
Greece’s generous retirement policies for some public sector workers.96  As in the 
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previous period, The Sun was hostile to the single currency, and the articles in late April 
and early May of 2010 included an often-stated distaste for the Euro: “Thank goodness 
we have still got pound coins rattling round in our pockets and purses—and not Euros,” 
read one self-congratulatory article discussing the financial problems in the Eurozone.97  
While The Sun’s financial crisis coverage is illustrative of its perceptions of Greece, 
many excluded articles pointed to an interesting dynamic between the two states; some 
articles not including substantial discussion of the Greek financial crisis specifically, 
which resulted in their exclusion, often pointed to Greece as the worst-case scenario for 
Britain when the paper criticized the government’s financial policies.  While such a 
characterization of Greece is most certainly negative and unforgiving, it also indicates a 
degree of perceived association between the two states; instead of painting Greece as an 
outlier facing a unique fate, its plight was taken as a cautionary tale, revealing the 
possibility that Greece and Britain are not entirely different from one another in The 
Sun’s perception, a nontraditional form of solidarity without sympathy.  Increased 
interest in Greece and the Eurozone crisis on the part of the paper’s readership led to 
more of the biased language and sensationalism that made The Sun famous as a tabloid, 
resulting in coverage of the first Greek bailout that was significantly less neutral than its 
coverage of the beginning of Greece’s public financial woes. 
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Financial Times 
FT Moment 2 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 20  15 114 85 
Austerity deserved 2 1 132 99 
Us vs. Them 0 0 134 100 
Moral narrative 13 10 121 90 
Fear 3 2 131 98 
 
 The second moment saw the Financial Times nearly triple its coverage of Greece’s 
financial crisis, with 268 relevant articles published in the late April to early May 2010 
period; since more than 100 relevant articles were published in the period, every other 
article was read, leaving 134 for analysis.  Compared to the previous period, the 
Financial Times’ coverage revealed similar scores on indicators of bias, with fifteen 
percent of its articles employing stereotypical language and ten percent revealing a moral 
narrative of the Greek financial crisis; the paper generally lacked an emphasis on 
austerity as a deserved punishment, a juxtaposition of the paper’s national public against 
Greece’s, or sensationalism or fear-mongering.  A recurring tactic in Financial Times 
articles in this period was the juxtaposition of Greeks against other national publics, 
especially other debtor states.  Portugal was often held up as an example of a “good” 
debtor state—Portugal is characterized as more credible than Greece, and the “Portuguese 
did not lie,” differentiating Portugal’s situation from Greece’s.98  A quote by Christine 
Lagarde, then France’s finance minister and the future Managing Director of the IMF, 
was reprinted several times, differentiating Greece from Portugal based on Greece’s 
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incorrect statistical data.99  Greeks were also negatively contrasted with Koreans, who 
handed in their gold to help their country out of the financial crisis in the late 1990s, the 
implication being that Greeks were not making similarly honorable personal sacrifices100; 
Greeks conversely tried to delay the process and should have been made to accept harsh 
terms in order to show their commitment to “painful” reforms.101  Greeks who had 
“become used to relative wealth” were also compared negatively to the “hardily 
resourceful” Latvians.102  Stereotypical allusions were again made using the language of 
sin and punishment to Greek “profligacy,” “malfeasance,” Greece’s lies in entering the 
Eurozone, allegations of corruption, and a lack of “fiscal discipline.”103  The concept of a 
“credibility deficit” continued into this period.104  Moralizing explanations for the crisis 
abounded, with some articles condemning the “cultures of entitlement” in a nation of 
some of “the world’s leading spendthrifts” and others focusing more directly on Greece’s 
public debt.105  Finally, distinctions were also drawn between Greece and creditor states; 
the crisis is framed as a situation solved when “German voters agree to pay [Greeks’] 
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pensions” and the “problems of the periphery are reluctantly being absorbed by the core,” 
indicating underlying tension in the concept of European solidarity.106  The Financial 
Times in the second period maintained the edge of hostility and negativity displayed in 
the first period, relying on stereotypes and moral narratives of the crisis in its extensive 
coverage of the Greek financial crisis. 
 
Moment 3: A Sisyphean Labor107, February 14-21, 2012 
 In the early hours of February 21, 2012, the second Greek bailout package was 
finalized, granting Greece €130 billion from the EU and the IMF in order to avoid 
imminent bankruptcy.  The bailout contained further harsh austerity measures and 
provisions for significant monitoring of Greece’s finances by its international lenders.  
The period found Greece further downgraded by international ratings agencies and a 
worsening situation in the state both politically and economically, with concerns being 
raised in the international media about the future of its governance and its ability to stave 
off a default.  The approval process for the second bailout did not go smoothly, with 
significant delays in discussions on the size and extent of the package and the 
accompanying cuts Greece would face.  Greece’s penance and attempts at recovering 
from its financial woes began to seem less like Herculean labors and more like Sisyphean 
ones, with a palpable sense of futility in discussions of the crisis as more Greek data 
became available.  News coverage from February 14, 2012 to February 28, 2012 
encompasses the uncertainty leading up to the second bailout’s approval, the conflict 
                                                 
106
 “So What Should We Be Doing as Europe Implodes,” Financial Times, May 1, 2010. 
“Risk Rally Stalls Amid US Uncertainty,” Financial Times, April 30, 2010. 
107
 “‘Unvollendet ist jedes politische Projekt,’” Die Zeit, May 2, 2010, URL 68. 
 48
between German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and Greek President Karolos 
Papoulias, and the subsequent beginning of the approval processes in member states’ 
parliaments. 
 Recurring themes in the third moment include discussions on the deepening 
recession in Greece, the possibility of a refocusing from austerity to state building, and 
perspectives on a Greek default or exit from the Eurozone. 
 
Bild 
Bild Moment 3 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 13 33 26 66 
Austerity deserved 0 0 39 100 
Us vs. Them 11 28 28 72 
Moral narrative 2 5 37 95 
Fear 6 15 33 85 
 
 In the third moment, Bild published thirty-nine articles on the Greek debt crisis, a 
dramatic decline from the quantity it produced in the second period, but more than in the 
first, indicating continued interest on the part of its readership in Greece’s financial woes.  
While discussions of austerity as a punishment and moral narratives of the crisis were 
largely absent in February 2012, Bild did employ significant stereotyping (33%), “us 
versus them” juxtapositions (11%), and fear mongering (15%) in its news coverage in the 
third period.  A quote from Franz Fehrenbach, CEO of Bosch, reappeared several times 
in Bild; Fehrenbach commented on Greece’s ailing economy, calling it an “untragbare 
Belastung,” or “unsustainable burden” on the Eurozone, criticizing “Phantom-Rentner” 
and “reichen Nichtsteuerzahlern,” or “phantom pensioners” and “wealthy tax evaders,” 
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and calling for Greece to exit or be pushed out of the Eurozone.108  Further stereotyping 
occurred with the characterization of Greece as a “Fass ohne Boden,” or “bottomless pit,” 
and the continued use of the epithet “Pleite-Griechen,” or “bankrupt Greeks.”109  A 
conflict with which Bild was preoccupied in this period was the use of Nazi imagery in 
Greece to criticize Germany, especially after Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s 
controversial remarks about his preferred composition of the Greek government; 
Schäuble and Chancellor Angela Merkel were depicted with swastikas and wearing Nazi 
uniforms, which Bild regarded as especially offensive given Germany’s financial 
assistance to Greece.110  Fear-mongering tactics were also used in the February 2012 
period to rile up anxiety about Greece; the paper predicted the end of the Euro, rampant 
political radicalism by “Kommunisten, Judenhasser,” and “Halb-Kriminelle,” or 
“communists, anti-Semites, and half-criminals,” and it even debated the possibility of a 
military coup in Greece based on the President’s exhortation to Greek politicians to 
defend the homeland like soldiers.111  While one article pointed out the dangers of 
reviving nationalist thinking in discussions of the financial crisis, Bild opposed the 
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second bailout, and its overall negative attitude towards Greece was readily apparent in 
its coverage of the crisis.112 
 
Die Zeit 
Zeit Moment 3 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 10  19 44 81 
Austerity deserved 2 4 52 96 
Us vs. Them 5 9 49 91 
Moral narrative 7 13 47 87 
Fear 2 4 52 96 
 
 In the February 2012 period, Die Zeit employed relatively few core indicators of 
bias in the articles it published on the Greek debt crisis, with a reliance on stereotypes 
(19%), moral narratives (13%), and an “us versus them” mentality (9%) featuring most 
prominently.  The paper published fifty-four articles relevant to Greece in the period, 
approximately half of the volume it published in its coverage of the first bailout, 
indicating a possible decline in interest in the details of Greece’s financial concerns on 
the part of its readership.  Die Zeit’s stated attitude towards Greece remained the same: 
the paper was largely sympathetic to Greece, especially with regard to the recession and 
the social impact of austerity, and it supported the second bailout.113  The publication 
printed a piece by Herbert Schui of Die Linke, Germany’s Left Party, criticizing austerity 
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as a poor deficit reduction plan that ultimately serves to weaken labor rights.114  The 
paper also continued to favor further European integration and was sympathetic towards 
Greek anti-Schäuble anger after the Finance Minister put out a statement that gave the 
impression that he wanted to dictate the composition of Greece’s government.115  Die Zeit 
shifted its focus from austerity to “Staatsaufbau,” or “state building,” for Greece, 
supporting ideas for a new “Marshall plan” to help the state return to competitiveness and 
growth.116  The paper also heavily criticized German tabloid Bild for its anti-Greek biases 
and Chancellor Angela Merkel for reinforcing the “Klische des faulen Griechen,” or “the 
cliché of the lazy Greek.”117  Despite the lack of stated bias against Greece, Die Zeit still 
showed some indicators of negative perceptions: Greeks were again accused of living 
beyond their means and of being “Prasser and Schummler,” or “spendthrifts and 
cheaters,” among other stereotypes, despite such views not being in accord with the 
paper’s stated position.118  The paper also printed several articles that drew a distinction 
between debtor and creditor states, ranging from statements about Greece needing to 
prove it can stay in the Eurozone to the assertion that the North is being made to pay for 
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the South;119 one piece argued for a “North-Euro” that would exclude the Southern states 
facing financial crises.120  Thus, Die Zeit, despite its stated position as Greek-friendly, 
still provided space for anti-Greek stereotypes, “us versus them” positions, and moral 
narratives of the crisis. 
 
The Sun 
Sun Moment 3 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 1  14 6 86 
Austerity deserved 0 0 7 100 
Us vs. Them 0 0 7 100 
Moral narrative 0 0 7 100 
Fear 0 0 7 100 
 
 The Sun in the third moment published only seven articles discussing the events in 
Greece, half as many as it featured in the previous period, another indicator of the 
relatively low level of interest the British public sustained on the topic of Greece at this 
point in the financial crisis.  Perhaps as a result of the lack of interest, the paper covered 
Greece almost entirely neutrally, with only one article employing negative Greek 
stereotypes.  While Greeks were described as “hapless” in one article, the rest of the 
articles criticized austerity, commented neutrally on Greece’s most recent downgrade, 
and blamed the Euro for the problems in Greece.121  The Sun argued that the “ultra-
tough” austerity was to blame for the lack of growth in Greece, with Brussels leading the 
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country “up the Greek.”122  The bailout was criticized as being to save the Euro, not the 
people, continuing on the paper’s trend of disapproval of the single currency.123  The 
paper’s coverage was bland in comparison to its usually incendiary and lively style, an 
important sign for the place that Greece held in the mind of the British general public—
Greece was not a priority, and by February 2012, its concerns and crises had faded into 
the background for The Sun and its readership. 
 
Financial Times 
FT Moment 3 Yes No N % N % 
Stereotypes 13  15 71 85 
Austerity deserved 1 1 83 99 
Us vs. Them 0 0 84 100 
Moral narrative 4 5 80 95 
Fear 1 1 83 99 
 
 The Financial Times published 167 relevant articles in the third period, indicating 
sustained interest on the part of its readership on the topic of Greece; 84 articles were 
considered for the purposes of this analysis.  The paper was almost entirely free of all the 
indicators of bias in this period with the exception of stereotypes, which were used in 
15% of its articles.  The quote from the CEO of Bosch, which described Greece as an 
“unacceptable burden” and was popular in German media, made its appearance in the 
Financial Times as well.124  The paper made use of the usual stereotypes, commenting on 
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Greek incompetence and “largesse without commensurate taxation.”125  One 
exceptionally harsh letter to the editor criticized an image of a poverty-stricken Greek 
couple because, the writer alleged, their apartment appeared to have a view of the 
Acropolis, so they could easily economize by moving—“Problem solved!” declared the 
article, mocking their plight.126  The paper picked up on some of the shift towards 
discussions of how to improve the situation in Greece other than austerity (including the 
“Marshall plan” idea) and criticized the debt-reduction agreements for increasing 
Greece’s financial woes127; previous austerity measures have left “no more room to cut 
public spending,” argued one piece.128  The Financial Times was unafraid to criticize 
Germany in this period, including negative commentary on Bild’s coverage of the crisis 
and Germany’s apparent indifference to the pain of austerity.129  The paper in this period 
remained somewhat hostile to Greeks personally, but its commentary on the appeared to 
have taken a bigger-picture perspective on the crisis overall. 
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VII. Public Opinion: Polling Data 
 Polling data provides an opportunity to examine the professed views of EU member 
states’ national publics and assess the level of agreement with the media analysis offered 
above.  German and British polling results offer another insight into mass opinions within 
the states and answer the question of whether the biases detected in my media analysis 
are observed when citizens are directly asked about their opinions.  The Pew Research 
Center’s Global Attitudes Project conducts international public opinion research on a 
variety of issues, including Europeans’ opinions on the EU.  The Eurobarometer, an 
effort of the European Commission, addresses issues relevant to European citizens 
specifically.  Both Pew and Eurobarometer survey results are indispensable resources for 
observing the orientations of European citizens in response to the crisis and over time.  
The results from their studies further support the data found in my media analysis when 
examined from the perspective of the core indicators of bias. 
 
Stereotypes and Negative Opinions 
In What European Country Are 
People the Least Hardworking? 1 2 3 
Britain Greece Great Britain Italy/Spain 
France Greece Italy Spain 
Germany Greece Italy Spain 
Greece Germany Greece Italy 
Italy Romania Greece Italy 
Spain Greece Italy Spain 
Source: Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 2012. 
Note: “Don’t know” responses were excluded. 
 
 Evidence of stereotypes can be found in the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s poll on 
perceptions of which countries, according to other Europeans, are the least hardworking.  
When asked which European nation has the least hardworking people, both the British 
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and the German respondents named Greece as the laziest nation, as did the French and 
Spanish respondents.  A common stereotype that arose in the British and German news 
sources was Greek laziness or irresponsibility as a factor in the financial crisis, and these 
poll results provide more evidence for the existence of the stereotype.  Interestingly, 
Greeks accused Germans of laziness in the 2012 poll; this allegation likely stems from 
the anger directed at Germany’s handling of the Greek debt crisis, since Germans are 
more commonly characterized as ruthlessly hardworking than lazy.  Other than Greece, 
debtor states Italy and Spain were also mentioned in the top three laziest states by many 
of the polled national publics, indicating that the Southern European debtor states as a 
whole are subject to negative opinions and allegations of laziness.  British and German 
news sources’ views on Greeks’ alleged laziness match the views professed by British 
and German national publics, who appear to believe the stereotypical and negative 
language used to characterize Greeks. 
In What European Country 
Are People the Most Corrupt? 1 2 3 
Britain Italy Greece Great Britain 
France Italy Greece France 
Germany Italy Greece Germany 
Greece Greece Germany Italy 
Italy Italy Romania Greece 
Spain Spain Italy Greece 
Source: Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 2012. 
Note: “Don’t know” responses were excluded. 
 
 The Pew poll on which European countries are the most corrupt further reflects the 
stereotypes commonly held about Greeks.  Greece was mentioned in the top three most 
corrupt by respondents from Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain—
interestingly, of those, only Greeks ranked themselves as the most corrupt, with Italy 
more often claiming the top spot.  Greeks appear to have internalized, either from 
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personal experience or from other sources, their own reputation for corruption, an attitude 
similarly reflected in the poll on the level of hard work, where Greeks ranked themselves 
the second laziest.  The results from other respondents indicate that familiarity may breed 
contempt when it comes to allegations of corruption, with German, British, Italian, and 
Spanish respondents criticizing their own states as well.  Despite the self-criticism, the 
polling data indicates that the views espoused in German and British news sources about 
Greek corruption are representative of their citizens’ professed views. 
Opinion of Greece Survey Favorable Unfavorable 
Britain Spring 2012 48 36 Spring 2010 60 15 
Germany Spring 2012 27 72 Spring 2010 40 52 
Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2010-12. 
Note: “Very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” have been combined into “favorable”; 
“somewhat unfavorable” “very unfavorable” have been combined into “unfavorable.” 
 
 British and German citizens’ opinions of Greece in a Spring 2010 and Spring 2012 
Pew poll indicate a similar negative opinion of Greece in both countries, this time more 
generally.  In Britain, while a majority of polled citizens had a favorable view of Greece 
in 2010 towards the beginning of the crisis, the percentage reporting some degree of 
unfavorable views more than doubled by the same time two years later.  Germans began 
the crisis with slightly more than half holding an unfavorable opinion of Greece, but they 
indicated a relatively even distribution between favorable and unfavorable views; two 
years later, nearly three quarters of Germans reported unfavorable views of Greece—an 
overwhelming majority of the German public.  The general negativity directed towards 
Greece and observed in this poll reinforces the negative language used in the British and 
German news sources’ coverage of the financial crisis in Greece. 
 
 Integration, Separation, and Fear
Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2012.
Note: Responses for “Major Threat” and “Minor Threat” have been combined for “Yes.”
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 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2012.
Note: “Other” and “Don’t know/Refused” responses have been excluded.
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Euro in light of the financial crisis, the extent to which citizens approve or disapprove of 
the Euro can be seen as a proxy for their views on existing levels of integration.  When 
German citizens were asked about the Euro’s effect on Germany, responses were split 
relatively evenly between believing it had a negative effect or a positive effect, with over 
20% of respondents selecting “neither.”  The relationship between Germans and 
integration is encapsulated in this poll; there is a divide between the masses and the elites, 
as well as significant middle ground in the German political sphere on the topic of what 
to do in response to the crisis.  The British version, which asked about the effect of not 
having the Euro, yielded very different results: British respondents overwhelmingly 
agreed that not having the Euro was a good thing for Britain, indicating the greater degree 
of Euroskepticism in the state.  These views and the cleavages among states and different 
levels of society were reflected in the media analysis as well. 
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VIII. Discussion 
 The analysis of British and German media sources yielded results that confirmed 
my hypotheses.  Both British and German news sources revealed evidence of bias against 
Greece according to the five indicators I selected for evaluation, but there were 
differences across critical cleavages.  The views expressed by the British and German 
tabloids and elite sources were in accord with the results from the Pew Research Center’s 
Global Attitudes Project and the Eurobarometer.  British and German elites had different 
orientations towards European integration as a whole, and nationality was one important 
cleavage revealed through my media analysis.  Germans were more supportive of 
European solidarity compared to their British counterparts, who largely looked upon the 
situation as outsiders.  The British and German general publics had more in common in 
terms of negative views against Greece, but there were differences in what conditioned 
their negative responses, with their relationship to the Euro playing an important role.  
There was a significant cleavage between elites and masses in general observed in the 
news sources that reflected the literature on European integration and holds implications 
for the future integration as a whole. 
 
British Elite vs. German Elite Opinion 
 British elites and German elites revealed crucial differences between one another, 
and the differences are the first important cleavage illuminated by this study.  While both 
the Financial Times and Die Zeit consistently indicated some degree of bias against 
Greece, especially in the categories of stereotypes and moral narratives, the attitudes 
revealed towards Greece differentiated the two elite groups.  Die Zeit made efforts to 
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stem criticism of Greece, condemning other German news sources for their biased 
coverage and investigating the social impact of austerity, while the Financial Times 
generally remained focused on the economic facts.  This difference reflects historical 
attitudes of British and German elites.  German elites have a historical legacy of 
supporting integration; German leaders were instrumental in the formation of 
incarnations of supranational institutions that eventually became the EU, and they have a 
record of driving integration in the postwar period.131  This pro-Europe orientation is 
clearly visible in Die Zeit’s insistence on remaining positive about integration and its 
attempts at solidarity when discussing Greece.  While the paper still reveals some anti-
Greek bias, it takes European integration as a good in and of itself.  This may in part be 
because of the paper’s belief that Germany has reaped benefits from integration; 
however, the bailouts to Greece had an undeniable cost to the German state, and Die 
Zeit’s continued support for integration and helping Greece indicate that something more 
was at stake in discussions of the financial crisis than the bottom line.  Conversely, the 
British elite appeared to look at the financial system first; the Financial Times is an 
economics-oriented publication that does not appear to be inherently pro-integration or 
view integration as intrinsically good.  The paper overall favored the use of stereotypical 
or negative language and made use of morality tales, and it did not display the 
endorsement of integration seen in Die Zeit, although it was not hostile to the concept in 
the ways seen in the publications intended for non-elite consumption.  The Financial 
Times appears to have internalized the prevalent Euroskepticism in Britain, while Die 
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Zeit seems to respond to and embody the historical legacy of postwar German elites.  
History matters in the different orientations of British and German elites on the topic of 
European integration, orientations that condition their perceptions of Greece. 
 
British Mass vs. German Mass Opinion 
 While the British and German popular sources indicated more agreement on Greece 
in that their views were remarkably negative, the national public of each state appeared to 
have different reasons for the anti-Greek bias revealed in the media analysis and poll 
results.  While The Sun did engage in negative commentary on Greece, the small volume 
of articles published on Greece during the first and third moments selected for analysis 
indicates the overall lack of interest the British public had in Greece when compared to 
their German counterparts, for whom Greece appeared to be a main topic of discussion.  
The lack of interest likely stems from the different relationships the states have with one 
another, a difference that can be attributed to Germany’s status as a member of the 
Eurozone, while the UK retained the Pound.  The sense of fear displayed in Bild across 
all three periods appears to be a response to the possibility of having a financial 
obligation to Greece; the British public, further removed as non-members of the 
Eurozone, perceived their financial relationship to Greece differently (and perhaps 
erroneously—the British contribution to the IMF also funded the Greek bailouts in part).  
The British Parliament did not have to vote to authorize the bailout, however, adding a 
degree of separation between the British public and the financial assistance to Greece 
through the IMF.  Another difference appears to be the relationship between Bild and the 
German government and The Sun and the British government; The Sun appeared to be 
 66
more concerned with criticizing its own government, while Bild supported Chancellor 
Merkel and her conservative government.  Bild did not celebrate the losses Merkel’s 
coalition faced in the 2010 North Rhine/Westphalia elections, captured in the second 
moment of analysis; she was criticized strongly for her support of the bailout, but Bild did 
not support alternative candidates.  Overall, the Euro issue appears to have conditioned 
the different responses to the crisis at the mass level.  The Sun often indicated relief at not 
being members of the Eurozone; conversely, German resentment and fear appeared to 
stem in part from the fear of the effect on their own currency.  The British separation 
from the continent, both in terms of its currency and its lack identification with Europe, 
seen in both The Sun’s reporting and the polling results, contrasts with the German 
conception of ownership of the Euro.  More common than calls to return to the D-Mark 
in Bild were requests for Greece to leave.  Thus, while both Bild and The Sun indicated 
anti-Greek bias, the reasoning behind their similar responses appears to differ 
significantly. 
 
Elite vs. Mass Opinion 
 The elite versus mass cleavage with regard to EU integration appears to be 
important in perceptions of Greece.  As a whole, Bild and The Sun were much more wary 
of integration and critical of Greece than their elite-level counterparts, Die Zeit and the 
Financial Times.  The popular opposition to EU integration is demonstrated most 
prominently by the fear mongering and sensationalism of the two tabloids; while this can 
be attributed in part to their journalistic style, the fears underlying the sensationalism are 
real and palpable in the general public.  Their concerns are reflected in the public opinion 
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polls on EU integration issues, indicating that the anxiety felt in Bild and The Sun is more 
than just a technique for selling papers.  EU elites appear to have been integrated to some 
degree in that they are comfortable with the idea of it, even if, as seen in the Financial 
Times’ positions, they do not always agree with it.  My analysis reveals the tension 
between elites and the masses in the EU, providing evidence that they have not been 
integrated to the same extent. 
 
Moving Forward: Implications for Europe and Further Research 
 This study raises concerns about the future of the EU—how cohesive can it hope to 
be in the future if national stereotypes and deep tensions continue to exist to this day? 
While there is a clear desire on the part of German elites to integrate further, it appears 
from my analysis of the British and German national publics that the people do not want 
the integration their leaders covet, and there exists significant variance in the perceived 
level of integration between elites and the masses.  While the democratic deficit in the 
EU weakens the ability of national publics to express their reluctance to integrate, they 
continue to speak out through their characterization of the crisis and through their 
parliaments.  If Europe is to have any hope of the less contentious integration envisioned 
by elites, the masses must be incorporated into the European project with their consent.  
Leaders must acknowledge the resistance to further integration and address the public’s 
concerns; the media analysis and polling data indicate that, if not, the hurdles along the 
path to Europe will only get higher as the masses turn against the European project. 
 My work has provided further evidence for the palpable tensions in the EU, and 
possibilities to expand on it abound.  Future work should examine not just coverage of 
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the financial crisis, but the ways in which Greeks are characterized in general in the 
creditor states’ news sources.  Additionally, a larger study could include more creditor 
states, such as Finland and the Netherlands, and more debtor states, such as Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal, to gather more evidence on the debtor vs. creditor and North vs. South 
dimension of the rhetoric.  Additionally, an in-depth study of the Greek perspective is 
lacking in my analysis, and it would undoubtedly help tell a richer story of Greece’s 
interactions with other EU states.  The causal mechanisms in my analysis remain 
unclear—I cannot be certain of the extent to which public opinion drives media coverage 
or the media shapes public opinion, although my analysis indicates that there is a 
reciprocal relationship between the two.  I hope the rhetoric of the crisis is explored 
further, whether from the perspective of creditors or debtors, and that our understanding 
of these relationships can be expanded in the future.  
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